Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Wilson,G/Schpall,S, Eucleides and Stephen Boulter

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
22138 Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
22134 Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
22150 Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
22139 Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
22136 Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
22135 Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
1757 The Electra: she knows this man, but not that he is her brother [Eucleides, by Diog. Laertius]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
22152 Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22156 The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
3028 The chief good is unity, sometimes seen as prudence, or God, or intellect [Eucleides]